

USAWC STRATEGY RESEARCH PROJECT

STABILITY OPERATIONS: GETTING IT RIGHT  
IN THE GLOBAL WAR ON TERRORISM

by

Colonel Timothy A. Reisch  
United States Army National Guard

Colonel Dan Jensen  
Project Adviser

This SRP is submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements of the Master of Strategic Studies Degree. The U.S. Army War College is accredited by the Commission on Higher Education of the Middle States Association of Colleges and Schools, 3624 Market Street, Philadelphia, PA 19104, (215) 662-5606. The Commission on Higher Education is an institutional accrediting agency recognized by the U.S. Secretary of Education and the Council for Higher Education Accreditation.

The views expressed in this student academic research paper are those of the author and do not reflect the official policy or position of the Department of the Army, Department of Defense, or the U.S. Government.

U.S. Army War College  
CARLISLE BARRACKS, PENNSYLVANIA 17013

Report Documentation Page			Form Approved OMB No. 0704-0188		
Public reporting burden for the collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing instructions, searching existing data sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing the collection of information. Send comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of this collection of information, including suggestions for reducing this burden, to Washington Headquarters Services, Directorate for Information Operations and Reports, 1215 Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 1204, Arlington VA 22202-4302. Respondents should be aware that notwithstanding any other provision of law, no person shall be subject to a penalty for failing to comply with a collection of information if it does not display a currently valid OMB control number.					
1. REPORT DATE <b>18 MAR 2005</b>		2. REPORT TYPE		3. DATES COVERED -	
4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE <b>Stability Operations Getting it Right in the Global War on Terrorism</b>				5a. CONTRACT NUMBER	
				5b. GRANT NUMBER	
				5c. PROGRAM ELEMENT NUMBER	
6. AUTHOR(S) <b>Timothy Reisch</b>				5d. PROJECT NUMBER	
				5e. TASK NUMBER	
				5f. WORK UNIT NUMBER	
7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) <b>U.S. Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, Carlisle, PA, 17013-5050</b>				8. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION REPORT NUMBER	
9. SPONSORING/MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES)				10. SPONSOR/MONITOR'S ACRONYM(S)	
				11. SPONSOR/MONITOR'S REPORT NUMBER(S)	
12. DISTRIBUTION/AVAILABILITY STATEMENT <b>Approved for public release; distribution unlimited</b>					
13. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES					
14. ABSTRACT <b>See attached.</b>					
15. SUBJECT TERMS					
16. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF:			17. LIMITATION OF ABSTRACT	18. NUMBER OF PAGES <b>33</b>	19a. NAME OF RESPONSIBLE PERSON
a. REPORT <b>unclassified</b>	b. ABSTRACT <b>unclassified</b>	c. THIS PAGE <b>unclassified</b>			



## ABSTRACT

AUTHOR: Colonel Timothy A. Reisch  
TITLE: Stability Operations: Getting it Right in the Global War on Terrorism  
FORMAT: Strategy Research Project  
DATE: 18 March 2005 PAGES: 33 CLASSIFICATION: Unclassified

The Global War on Terrorism is well underway and, as the President promised, it is unlike any war this nation has ever previously fought. Major combat operations in both Afghanistan and Iraq lasted a very short time, however, it is a generally accepted premise that our armed forces will remain in these countries for a considerable time to come conducting stability operations. Post-conflict activities and peace operations can actually be more difficult and at times more dangerous than major combat.

Failed states and weak countries represent a potential breeding ground for terrorist networks and, therefore, need to be assisted to eliminate that threat. Failure to provide needed help can result in overthrow by terrorist groups and/or regional instability. The list of countries with dysfunctional governments seems to grow longer with the passage of time. Because the US has many resources and possesses the most powerful military in the world, it will be required to conduct stability operations in numerous locations while simultaneously seeking out and destroying terrorist cells and protecting the homeland. Maintaining adequate public support as these missions are executed (all the time taking casualties) will be a very tall order, but without it, the US will ultimately disengage, allowing terrorist cells to continue targeting locations throughout the world.

This paper reviews stability operations conducted by the US in post World War II Europe, Somalia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Rwanda, Haiti and those currently underway in Iraq. It applies what has been learned in the previous operations to the intricacies of the Global War on Terrorism to chart a better course for current and future operations.



## TABLE OF CONTENTS

ABSTRACT.....	iii
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS .....	vii
STABILITY OPERATIONS: GETTING IT RIGHT IN THE GLOBAL WAR ON TERRORISM.....	1
<b>A REVIEW OF PAST U.S. STABILITY OPERATIONS .....</b>	<b>2</b>
POST WORLD WAR II.....	2
SOMALIA.....	3
BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA.....	4
RWANDA.....	6
HAITI.....	7
IRAQ .....	10
<b>PRESIDENT BUSH'S STRATEGY TO DEFEAT TERRORISM .....</b>	<b>11</b>
<b>RECOMMENDATION .....</b>	<b>12</b>
ENDNOTES .....	17
BIBLIOGRAPHY .....	21



## ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

I am very grateful for my wife Anne who has enthusiastically supported my career in the South Dakota Army National Guard. Her accompanying me to the War College has done a great deal to facilitate my course of study. I am also thankful for my children who at the ages of 20, 18, 16, and 13 followed me across the country so I could pursue this once in a lifetime career opportunity. I regret missing the family events that occurred during weekends I was away for Guard training. I am very proud of you all, Terra, Tim, Trevor and Tamara. I also want to extend my sincere thanks to Bob & Mary Henkel who cared for the boys when they returned to South Dakota in October.

My attendance at War College would not be possible without the understanding and support of the Honorable M. Michael Rounds, Governor of South Dakota. His decision to grant me a leave of absence from my cabinet duties was in keeping with the finest traditions of patriotism that have ever been demonstrated by any South Dakota National Guard Commander in Chief since the state's inception. I am truly honored to be a member of the Rounds Administration.

I would also like to acknowledge Colonel Dan Jensen who has served both as my faculty advisor and SRP advisor during this year. Your professional advice and guidance have been greatly appreciated. Your adept skills as an educator combined with your friendly disposition (and softball prowess) will forever be remembered by the resident students of Seminar 9 graduating in the year 2005.





## STABILITY OPERATIONS: GETTING IT RIGHT IN THE GLOBAL WAR ON TERRORISM

On September 11, 2001 the US was victimized by horrific terrorist attacks that would profoundly change both how safe Americans felt at home, as well as what kind of threats we believed could develop in failed nation states. Suddenly, the hegemonic powerhouse that had seemingly just begun to consider what it would do with budget surpluses was forced to devote significant resources to protect its homeland. America had to consider how to utilize every element of its national power to protect itself from follow-on attacks, while simultaneously conducting the arduous task of identifying, locating, and exterminating terrorists from the face of the earth.

Most Americans supported President Bush's decision to attack al-Qaeda in Afghanistan in retribution for what many at the time sensed to be the first significant terrorist attack on this country. The truth of the matter was that we had been hit numerous times previously. On February 26, 1993 we experienced the World Trade Center bombing which killed six Americans in New York.<sup>1</sup> On June 25, 1996 a truck bomb outside the Khobar Towers housing complex in Dhahran, Saudi Arabia, took 19 lives.<sup>2</sup> In the port of Aden, Yemen, on October 12, 2000, 17 servicemen were killed aboard the USS Cole.<sup>3</sup> The passage of time and global distances in the two latter cases seem to have faded the memory of the earlier attacks. But the events of September 11, 2001 would cause America to re-evaluate our fundamental approach toward terrorism, including decisions involving what portion of our national resources could justifiably be expended to eliminate it.

In September of 2002, President George W. Bush published *The National Security Strategy of the United States of America* which articulated the fundamental goals and objectives the nation must target in order to maintain its strong and influential position in the world. This public document made it clear that the US would attack and destroy terrorist organizations "on many fronts...over an extended period of time" to rid the globe of their evil.<sup>4</sup> It also acknowledged that the US possessed "finite political, economic, and military resources to meet our global priorities," but made it clear that we should be prepared to invest those resources to create (or restore) stability in various regions of interest throughout the world.<sup>5</sup> This theme, as expressed by the President, is particularly characteristic of how the events of September 11 redefined what was important for many Americans, for a mere two years earlier, "candidate" George W. Bush indicated that using our military to conduct nation-building in certain places around the world was inappropriate.<sup>6</sup> The theme that George Bush expressed while campaigning for office most likely made sense in the minds of many Americans: the US

shouldn't be quick to deploy our military forces around the globe trying to fix everyone else's problems because it is a waste of precious resources. Following September 11 the situation was much different. America had been attacked on our homeland, and suddenly the rhetoric of fundamentalist groups and the instability of various countries around the world seemed to matter a great deal more.

## **A REVIEW OF PAST U.S. STABILITY OPERATIONS**

The US has rendered assistance to foreign states many times over the course of its history for a variety of reasons. The term "Stability Operations" has not been in the official lexicon for very long, but it connotes a number of different activities that the US has conducted throughout the world for decades, such as Humanitarian Assistance, Nation Assistance, Support to Counterinsurgency, Protection of Shipping, and Peace Operations.<sup>7</sup> Some duties are of a newer variety such as Combating Terrorism.<sup>8</sup>

This purpose of this paper is to briefly review stability operations conducted by the US in post World War II Europe, Somalia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Rwanda, Haiti and those currently underway in Iraq. It then applies what has been learned in the previous operations to the intricacies of the Global War on Terrorism to chart a better course for current and future operations.

### **POST WORLD WAR II**

World War II left much of Europe in ruins. Much of the infrastructure had been annihilated, economies were decimated, and most people had a pessimistic view of the future. The efforts to rebuild Europe in 1946 and 1947 brought little progress, and President Harry Truman became concerned when Communism seemed to slowly emerge as an answer to these problems.<sup>9</sup> The US distrusted the Soviet Union, and was not about to sit by idly while Europe's failure to recover played into the hands of the communist regime. The world had learned some hard lessons about the dangers of demanding excessive reparations of a defeated enemy which had occurred under the Treaty of Versailles signed at the end of World War I. The German people believed that the huge reparations laid out in its terms represented punishment of the citizenry for mistakes made by the government. This animosity would later fuel Hitler's rise to power. The US had no intention of passively allowing Communism to infect European states the way Nazism had taken hold of Germany following World War I.

The Marshall Plan pumped \$13 billion dollars into war-torn Europe between the end of World War II and 1953.<sup>10</sup> In addition to fending off the spread of Communism, this plan served

to revitalize the European countryside and fired up the US economy in the process. One thing that the Marshall Plan did not do was to temper the mutual distrust between the US and the Soviet Union. The Cold War, which lasted from 1945-1989 kept both countries continually fixed on the other. Defense expenditures skyrocketed for both countries as they attempted to secure more advantageous positions. Even though there were some tense moments along the way (i.e. the Cuban Missile Crisis) having to watch one big, bad, enemy was somehow easier than having to monitor every dark corner of the world which seems to be the requirement today. A mere 13 United Nations peacekeeping operations were approved between 1945 and 1987 (42 years), while 14 new ones were approved between 1987 and 1992 (5 years). Among these were the United Nations interventions in Somalia that commenced in April, 1992 to aid millions who were suffering as a result of civil war.<sup>11</sup>

## SOMALIA

At the end of George H. W. Bush's presidency, he agreed to commit troops to a United Nations effort that was thought to be a short-term humanitarian assistance mission. Unfortunately, over time it morphed and protracted into a much more complicated, dangerous operation. A dysfunctional government in Somalia that was controlled by General Mohammed Siad Barre for over 20 years took a serious toll on the people of that country. Barre fled Somalia in January, 1991 and a civil war that had begun a decade earlier escalated in intensity, effectively curtailing all government services.<sup>12</sup> The turmoil that followed resulted in the starvation of an estimated 300,000 people between 1991 and 1992.<sup>13</sup> At the request of the United Nations, President Bush committed 25,000 troops in December of 1992, but made it clear that it was for a limited purpose, and that the troops should be home in time for President Clinton's Inauguration the following month. Things had not stabilized to the point that the US could conscientiously withdraw by the time Clinton took office, but the effort was scaled back, and by June, 1993 the number of US service members deployed to Somalia was down to 1,200. An extended state of instability kept the US engaged in an attempt to resolve the lingering systemic issues, and on October 3, 1993 eighteen US soldiers were killed and 84 wounded in a gun battle that took place in Mogadishu. Television images showing the dead bodies of U.S. servicemen being dragged through the streets shocked the American people, and four days later President Clinton ordered a phased withdrawal of our military from that country.

In Somalia, we had learned (the hard way) that humanitarian missions in "broken" countries could develop into extremely complicated operations. According to Colonel Kenneth Allard, the primary lessons learned from the experience in Somalia are as follows:

- Joint doctrine needed to be developed for peace operations.
- Clearly defined objectives are imperative to include what constitutes mission termination.
- Unity of effort can be difficult in operations other than war, as other governmental and non-governmental organizations (NGOs) are involved and command relationships can be unclear.
- Force protection remains a fundamental role of commanders in peace operations, and can be extremely challenging.
- Detailed rules of engagement must be developed, and they may change frequently.
- Peace operations can take years to achieve; therefore perseverance is required.
- Perceptions matter. In the absence of a legitimate government, peacekeepers must avoid actions that would seem to confer legitimacy on one individual or group over another.<sup>14</sup>

#### BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA

In September of 1991, the United Nations (UN) became involved in the crisis in the former Yugoslavia when it adopted Resolution 713, which called for a complete arms embargo on the former Yugoslavia.<sup>15</sup> An unconditional ceasefire was signed in January of 1992, and the following month the UN Security Council adopted Resolution 743 establishing UN Protection Force (UNPROFOR) that was to last for 12 months as an interim arrangement to end fighting in Croatia and to create conditions for peace and security required for the negotiation of an overall settlement of the crisis in former Yugoslavia.<sup>16</sup> Eventually Bosnia and Herzegovina were included in the UN effort to quell the fighting between the Bosnian Muslims and the Bosnian Croats on the one side and the Bosnian Serbs on the other. By May of 1993, instead of fighting as allies, the Bosnian Muslims and Croats were fighting each other. Hostilities continued throughout the year in spite of attempted cease fires. As time wore on, the Bosnian Serbs engaged in intense fighting with the government. Continued combat precluded efforts to provide humanitarian assistance to the many needy people of the region. UNPROFOR was extended time after time as it was obvious conditions had not improved. In late 1994 the UN Security Council passed Resolution 958 authorizing member states to conduct air strikes to assist the efforts of UNPROFOR.<sup>17</sup> In a separate resolution (959), fighting between Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina was condemned.<sup>18</sup> Bosnian Serb forces seemed undeterred by NATO air strikes.

Following another year of fighting, an agreement was brokered in Dayton, Ohio to end the fighting. An implementation force (IFOR) of about 60,000 peacekeepers under NATO control, conducted Operation Joint Endeavor from December 20, 1995 to December 20, 1996. This was followed by Stabilization Force (SFOR) operations that continued until December, 2004 when the European Union assumed the duty.<sup>19</sup> It has been 13 years since the UN became involved in the factional fighting in the former Yugoslavia, and yet today 212 (of what in 1996 was 952) weapons storage sites and an estimated 800,000 landmines remain to be cleared.<sup>20</sup>

Former Assistant Administrator for the Bureau of Food and Humanitarian Assistance of the US Agency for International Development (USAID) Andrew S. Natsios wrote of the difficulties in getting to an end state when working complex stability operations such as was the case in Bosnia Herzegovina. Natsios, also a retired USAR Lieutenant Colonel and Gulf War Veteran, identified five measurable objectives that return when societies return to normalcy:

- Repatriation and resettlement. Displaced persons should be resettled into their homes.
- Food security. A secure source of affordable food should be available and economic conditions such to allow people to support themselves.
- Low morbidity and mortality rates. Immunization programs for children, clean water and basic health care.
- Restoration of markets and economic activity. This includes farmers resumption of their crop and herd production and sufficient trade to create jobs.
- Restoration of physical security. A fair and honest criminal justice system can often be a lofty goal in unstable areas, but it is an essential ingredient for a functional society.<sup>21</sup>

Two meetings hosted by the US Army Peacekeeping Institute in May 1996 and April 1997 developed some lessons learned during US military involvement in the former Yugoslavia. A condensed version of how Dr. Max Manwaring (COL Retired) portrayed these lessons is as follows:

- Understand & deal with the political complexity. Intrastate conflicts such as those in the former Yugoslavia are very politically charged. In such cases, subtle “political, economic and psychological” maneuvering supported by effective “information

operations and careful intelligence work” can be more effective than the use of explosive military power.

- Address ad hoc arrangements in strategic planning & coordination. US and NATO did not work together closely on planning and coordination. Early on, military planners did not work with coalition partners, NGOs and other civilian organizations. “Mission creep” resulted due to the lack of both strategic clarity and unity of effort.
- The need for more mature doctrine. The US military needed clearer doctrinal guidance as they tried to work with coalition partners, NATO, NGOs host governments, and emotionally-charged, ethnically-divided people. Separating two nation states from each other is fairly straight-forward; get each of them back on their side of the border and keep them there. This becomes much more challenging when dealing with angry, starving, displaced groups from the same country fighting one another.
- The Total Army issue. Many of the types of units needed for effective peacekeeping operations are found in the reserve components. Changes should be considered to allow for quick deployment of these type of units.
- Force protection. The responsibility for force protection decisions should reside at the operational, not the strategic level.<sup>22</sup>

Bosnia and Herzegovina proved to be a huge challenge in the stability operations business. In a book he wrote after retiring, General Wesley Clark (Former Supreme Allied Commander in Europe) wrote that even though NATO forces were technically not at war, they were required to employ virtually all of their military skills to effectively perform their mission.<sup>23</sup> The European Union's assumption of stabilization duties on December 2, 2004 involved approximately 7,000 troops from 33 countries.<sup>24</sup>

## RWANDA

The fact that 18 American servicemen were killed in Somalia in October of 1993 is commonly cited as a reason the Clinton Administration was reluctant to intervene in a civil war that took place in Rwanda between April and July of 1994. An estimated 800,000 Tutsis and moderate Hutus were killed in just a few short months.<sup>25</sup> After the Hutu regime fell to the Tutsi rebels, the killing ended, and an estimated 2 million Hutu refugees fled to neighboring Burundi, Tanzania, Uganda, and Zaire (Democratic Republic of the Congo).

On July 22, 1994, President Clinton announced that the US would provide massive relief in the form of humanitarian aid to Rwandan refugees that had flooded into neighboring Zaire. Operation Support Hope sprang into action quickly, but military and congressional leaders sent early signals that they did not want this deployment to degrade into another problematic situation similar to Somalia. Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff GEN John M. Shalikashvili acknowledged the US military's ability to provide speedy assistance, but suggested the UN should organize itself so as to be able to deliver assistance in a similar manner without relying on US military assets.<sup>26</sup> The \$320 million supplemental appropriation request the Administration sent to Congress was trimmed by \$100 million and passed out with the requirement that US forces be withdrawn by October unless specifically authorized to remain there longer by Congress.

In the end, US military forces did re-deploy by September 30, 1994 much to the disappointment of the civilian relief agencies and other NGOs providing assistance. The military after-action report credited the "clear mission guidance" they received as the tool that allowed the commander to identify operational objectives and end state.<sup>27</sup> This ability to define an end state and get out before "mission creep" set in was consistent with what the military wanted. They had avoided "another Somalia," and that seemed crucial to the men and women in uniform.

In November 1994, US Ambassador Daniel L. Spiegel chaired a meeting of the Humanitarian Liaison Working Group in Geneva with JTF Support Hope Commander LTG Daniel Schroeder participating. One topic that the military and non-military entities agreed on was the need to conduct joint training that would include various relief organizations to practice how they could better coordinate their efforts in the future.<sup>28</sup> The key players of the Rwanda effort seemed to acknowledge that many different groups have roles to play in humanitarian relief operations; and the more those entities could work together ahead of time to become familiar with one another's functions, roles, and abilities the better their collective efforts would be.

## HAITI

Jean-Bertrand Aristide garnered 67% of the vote in Haiti's 1990 presidential election, but he was overthrown by rebellious members of the army in February 1991 and forced to leave the country in September. After de facto regimes took and later resigned from power on two subsequent occasions, the UN imposed sanctions in an attempt to restore constitutional government, and bring stability to the troubled nation. Three years of instability and suffering



seemed to surpass the limit and on July 31, 1994, the UN Security Council passed Resolution 940, which authorized member states to use “all necessary means” to restore constitutional government and the duly-elected Aristide to the office of president. The US took the lead in the planning and execution of Operation Uphold Democracy. A multinational force (MNF) was prepared to take the island country by storm to restore order but, thanks to the last minute negotiations of former President Jimmy Carter, the de facto leadership in control at that time was convinced to step down peacefully and the MNF composed of 20,000 US military personnel, plus some 2,000 personnel from a dozen other countries<sup>29</sup> was able to come ashore peacefully in September 1994.

Shortly after the initial deployment, the number of US military personnel peaked in Haiti at just over 23,000.<sup>30</sup> On March 31, 1995 peacekeeping responsibilities in Haiti were passed to the UN, and the UN Mission in Haiti (UNMIH) began what was scheduled as a one year effort to pave the way for a proposed March 1996 return to power of President Aristide. By September, there were 6,000 peacekeepers from 31 countries on the job as a part of UNMIH and 2,500 of them were US service-members.<sup>31</sup>

As a part of the process, the Haitian army was disbanded and a new Haitian Police Force was recruited, hired and trained.<sup>32</sup> This task was performed jointly by the US Department of Justice, and law enforcement officers from Canada, France and the US.<sup>33</sup> Elections were scheduled and conducted in a peaceful manner to put representative governments in place.

Speaking about the Haiti peacekeeping mission at Georgetown University during a September 21, 1995 Conference on Diplomacy and the Use of Force, Ambassador James F. Dobbins (Special Advisor on Haiti, US Department of State) pointed out that Haiti was dissimilar to some of our previous peacekeeping efforts in that it did not suffer from a bitter civil war. Rather it was “a society of pacific, largely unarmed peasant and urban masses that was terrorized by a small coterie of government sponsored thugs.”<sup>34</sup> According to Dobbins, the objectives of the MNF and UNMIH were fairly narrowly defined in the following areas:

- Restoration of the legitimate, democratically elected authorities;
- Creation of a secure climate in which these achievements could function, and democratic processes could resume their operation;
- Dismantlement of the old instruments of repression; and
- Assistance in the creation of a new set of professional and democratic institutions for security, including a new police force and reformed judiciary.<sup>35</sup>

According to Dobbins, these tasks were not unlike what the US had undertaken previously in a unilateral fashion in Grenada and Panama. One of the big changes in this scenario was the fact that over 40 nations participated in one way or another during the MNF or UNMIH phases of the operation.

It had become clear that the debacle in Somalia would not bring an end to the involvement of US troops in stabilization operations. In June of 1995, the Joint Chiefs published Joint Pub 3-07, *Joint Doctrine for Military Operations Other Than War* (commonly referred to as MOOTW). The publication identified the types of operations included in MOOTW as Arms Control, Combating Terrorism, DOD Support to Counter-drug Operations, Enforcement of Sanctions, Enforcing Exclusion Zones, Insuring Freedom of Navigation and Over flight, Humanitarian Assistance, Military Support to Civilian Authority, National Assistance/Support to Counterinsurgency, Noncombatant Evacuation Operations, Peace Operations, Protection of Shipping, Recovery Operations, Show of Force Operations, Strikes and Raids, and Support to Insurgency.<sup>36</sup>

In May of 1997 President Clinton issued written guidance on how to deal with what his administration termed "complex contingency operations"<sup>37</sup> Presidential Decision Directive (PDD) 56 described such operations as:

...peace operations such as the peace accord implementation operation conducted by NATO in Bosnia (1995-present) and the humanitarian intervention in northern Iraq called Operation Provide Comfort (1991); and foreign humanitarian assistance operations, such as Operation Support Hope in central Africa (1994) and Operation Sea Angel in Bangladesh (1991).<sup>38</sup>

PDD 56 seemed to officially acknowledge that these types of operations were likely to continue and the complexity of the issues involved required that a formal analysis be done to determine what (if any) involvement the US should take on a case by case basis.

On February 12, 1999 the Joint Chiefs of Staff issued Joint Pub 3-07.3 entitled *Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Peace Operations*. This publication, it would seem, endorsed the statement made decades earlier by UN Secretary General Dag Hammarskjöld who said "Peacekeeping is not a soldier's job, but only a soldier can do it."<sup>39</sup> In the executive summary, the Joint Chiefs acknowledge that "credible war-fighting skills are the foundation for successful performance in peace operations".<sup>40</sup> These operations are potentially dangerous, and servicemen who take part in them need to be acutely aware of that. It is logical that when countries decide to deploy military units to establish or keep the peace, the stakes are high.

## IRAQ

Saddam Hussein's refusal to comply with UN Resolutions, coupled with his efforts directed at securing weapons of mass destruction, resulted in the US led coalition attack that removed him from power in 2003. The people of Iraq who had been oppressed for years by the ruthless leader were immediately joyful at his removal from power. Government officials previously in authority seemed to vanish overnight and with them any sense of order. Government buildings were looted and millions of dollars worth of property was stolen and destroyed before some semblance of normalcy could be restored. The US and coalition leadership were surprised by this series of events and skeptics abounded. The decision to disband Hussein's army drew particularly heavy skepticism.

The recruiting, hiring, and training of Iraqis to fill military, police, and other required positions was a deliberate process. Over time, the impatience of the Iraqi people, coupled with the organization of resistance groups, made for a volatile situation. In addition, certain groups that believed they would lose influence under a democratic system of government became disruptive in hopes that their efforts would lead to the departure of US forces.

While the elections conducted on January, 2005 represented a milestone, there is still a great deal to accomplish before the new Iraqi government will be self-sufficient. Lingered resistance in Fallujah and other cities have required coalition forces and the newly-trained Iraqi National Guard units to go door-to-door to clear out pockets of resistance. Terrorist activity continues to claim the lives of coalition forces, civilian contractors, and of the Iraqi citizenry at large.

It seems likely that the years of stability operations that have been required in places like Bosnia and Kosovo could certainly be eclipsed by the efforts needed to bring things under control in Iraq. The cost estimates to rebuild Iraq have ranged from 18 to 80 billion dollars, which has undoubtedly caused some to consider the wisdom of the effort. US Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld described what was at stake in an editorial published in the Washington Post on September 25, 2004:

The work in Iraq is difficult, costly and dangerous. But it is worth the risks and the costs... If we succeed, we will deal terrorism a powerful blow, because a democratic Iraq in the heart of the Middle East would be a defeat for the ideology of terror that is seeking to take control of that area of the world.<sup>41</sup>

It is true that the Middle East is a region of the world that has been problematic for the US. The growth of democracy there could result in many positive outcomes for future generations. But the Middle East does not have a corner on the market when it comes to rogue leaders,

failed states, ethnic strife, anti-Americanism or terrorist groups. In fact typing the words “terrorist groups” on the US Department of State’s official web site will net over 1,000 hits.<sup>42</sup> To attempt to fix everything in the world is impossible, but to do nothing is unacceptable. Therefore, to protect the US from the dangers of terrorism requires a national strategy.

## **PRESIDENT BUSH'S STRATEGY TO DEFEAT TERRORISM**

Our Nation's cause has always been larger than our Nation's defense. We fight, as we always fight, for a just peace – a peace that favors liberty. We will defend the peace against the threats from terrorists and tyrants. We will preserve the peace by building good relations among the great powers. And we will extend the peace by encouraging free and open societies on every continent.

— President George W. Bush

The quote above is taken from a speech President Bush made at West Point on June 1, 2002, and can be found on page one of his National Security Strategy<sup>43</sup>. Defending the peace against “terrorists and tyrants,” and “encouraging free and open societies on every continent” is a huge task that will require tremendous resolve. All of the elements of national power (Military, Information, Diplomatic, Legal, Intelligence, Finance and Economic) are the means applied to accomplish the objectives listed above. The course of action (way) President Bush has chosen to achieve his stated objectives in this area places a large reliance on the military to root out terrorists and those who harbor them, (in a preemptive fashion if need be) and to deliver democratic principles around the world. The current deployments of the US armed forces have challenged both the active and reserve components.<sup>44</sup>

The President has been candid in communicating the long-term implications of such an endeavor with the American people. The Army transformation currently underway will convert the typical division structure into brigade combat teams, thereby creating a greater number of independently deployable units that can be used to cover the increasing demands around the world. This together with the temporary increase in Army force structure of 30,000 troops will see to it that our responsibilities in Iraq, Afghanistan, Korea, Kosovo and elsewhere continue to be met.

Some suggest that the UN should take a more active role in mitigating the instability that seems to be spreading throughout the world these days. It seems logical that “stability operations” worldwide should be their strong suit given the fact that they espouse human rights and humanitarian affairs.<sup>45</sup> They have conducted peacekeeping operations in numerous locations around the world since 1948.<sup>46</sup> Unfortunately, the world has witnessed a rise in the

number of failed states and a proliferation of terrorist groups in spite of the UN's best efforts. On October 19, 2004 the senior UN official in charge of counter-terrorism pledged "to intensify efforts to bring together governments, international organizations and other key players in a comprehensive fight against the scourge."<sup>47</sup>

One idea recently articulated during a closed lecture to the students at the US Army War College was to create a new group of responsible, like-minded countries, committed to the principles of freedom & democracy that would work collectively to rid the world of the scourges of terrorism once and for all.<sup>48</sup> I believe the US is ready to do this now, but it seems many other nations that espouse values similar to ours have simply not generated the initiative (or courage) to take a more active role.

Even the average US citizen seems to be growing weary of the demands that the global war on terrorism has imposed, and our work is far from over. A poll conducted on January 12, 2005 found that 46% of Americans believed the US should remain in Iraq; 45% believed forces should be withdrawn; and 9% were undecided.<sup>49</sup> An earlier poll found that 71% of U.S. citizens believed that we will always live with terrorism, and a mere 25% believed it would some day be eliminated.<sup>50</sup> Those numbers seem to indicate that US citizens have a less positive outlook regarding the war on terrorism than the President.

## **RECOMMENDATION**

The major combat operations conducted by the US in recent conflicts have been of relatively short duration, however, the forces required to remain in place following combat have heavily taxed both the active and reserve components as of late. The continuum of activities encompassed under "stability operations" is very broad indeed. It runs the gamut from delivering food to appreciative people in a peaceful setting, to conducting close combat operations, to expelling armed groups from a populated area. Until such time as resistance subsides, and a legitimate, functional government is restored, stabilization forces must remain in place. The danger associated with these operations requires that military units be used in virtually all such situations. In addition to requiring huge sums of money, the redundant deployments needed to maintain the current OPTEMPO throughout the world will be very hard on military personnel and equipment.

Ridding the world of terrorism, and stabilizing failed states to prevent the victimization of their people by parasitic groups, is a huge task. As tempting as it may seem, the US simply cannot "bring the boys home" and take an isolationist view. In addition to being irresponsible, to do so may result in the most horrific wide-scale humanitarian abuses that the world has ever

experienced. In order to be more effective in conducting stability operations world-wide, the US should make the following changes:

- Accentuate patience and diplomacy. The citizens of the US seem to have evolved into a less patient people over time. This characteristic could be affecting the way the US deals with other nations as well. Possessing a powerful military can tend to overshadow the true value of communication, diplomacy and the use of flexible deterrents. The Department of State should be given additional resources in order to effectively address the instability issues throughout the world. All of the elements of national power should always be employed with patience and resolve in order to have the best chance at attaining positive results.
- Increase emphasis at National Security Council (NSC) level. It is imperative that the most powerful people in government understand the value and significance of stability operations. Problematic areas throughout the world need to be monitored closely to stay abreast of the fundamental issues at hand. The ability to successfully intervene in a troubled area is contingent on many factors. Some situations are better left alone, at least for a time, in order to enhance the chances at an effective resolution. This philosophy must be represented at the table during every NSC meeting either by the Secretary of State, Secretary of Defense, or some other council member.
- Get other nations involved. The US must continue to identify partners that can contribute resources (both military and other) to stabilize failing governments and continue the fight against terrorism. The NATO intervention in Kosovo is a great example of how an international group can combine their collective resources to make a big impact on a significant world problem. The European Union's assumption of the Bosnia mission is another example. Geographical proximity seems to have provided at least some of the incentive in these cases. Friendly pressure should be applied toward China, Japan, India, Germany, France, Italy, Brazil, Russia, Canada, Mexico and Spain to take a more active role in settling these issues as they all rank in the top fifteen countries in the world for gross domestic production.<sup>51</sup>
- Capture the will of the people. The Bush Administration must do a better job of explaining to the American people (and our allies) why continuing these efforts is the right thing to do. As the number of military personnel killed in Iraq rises, the citizenry

questions more and more whether the objectives are truly worth the costs. The friendly center of gravity in the global war on terrorism is the will of the people; therefore communicating up-to-date information about the dangers being posed by terrorist cells is of paramount importance.

- Mitigate the OPTEMPO of our armed forces. The Army transformation currently underway will create additional brigade combat teams for rotational deployments. The addition of 30,000 positions will provide needed relief as well. Where feasible, the "one-year boots on the ground" requirement should be shortened to six or nine months. If recruiting goals are not met, enlistment bonuses and college benefits should be increased. The revenue needed to finance these enhancements could either be raised via a temporary gas tax increase or taken from domestic and foreign programs. The challenges levied on our armed forces must be balanced with rewards.
- Improve the planning process. A wise man once said "Plan your work then work your plan." One of the reasons the Iraqi people changed from cheering crowds to angry mobs in a matter of weeks was because adequate planning had not been done to sustain and restore critical services. It is critical that the interagency planning process is started early on. A civil-military plan needs to be developed that describes the end-state in sufficient detail to allow all agencies to develop their supporting plans.

Under America's democratic system of government, the people get to make the decisions. It is therefore imperative that they be fully informed of what is at stake in the various stability operations being conducted around the world and how they are directly tied to the preservation of the way of life we take for granted here in the US. It is best to be on the "team of nations," that will make this world safer, but the US doesn't always have to be the quarterback. Americans must remember that even here at home it took us a while to perfect this thing called democracy. It seems appropriate in closing this paper which deals with the challenges we face in stabilizing the world, to quote the 40<sup>th</sup> President of the United States who often spoke of the responsibilities and virtues of Americanism.

You and I have a rendezvous with destiny. We will preserve for our children this, the last best hope of man on earth, or we will sentence them to take the first step into a thousand years of darkness. If we fail, at least let our children and our children's children say of us we justified our brief moment here. We did all that could be done.

— Ronald Reagan

WORD COUNT=5,852





## ENDNOTES

<sup>1</sup> Wikipedia, "World Trade Center Bombing," 3 October 2004; available from <[http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/World\\_Trade\\_Center\\_bombing](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/World_Trade_Center_bombing)>; Internet; accessed 8 October 2004.

<sup>2</sup> William S. Cohen, Department of Defense, "Personal Accountability for Force Protection at Khobar Towers," 31 July 1997; available from <<http://www.defenselink.mil/pubs/khobar/>>; Internet; accessed 8 October 2004.

<sup>3</sup> Department of Defense, "USS Cole Commission Report," 9 January 2001; available from <<http://www.defenselink.mil/pubs/cole20010109.html>>; Internet; accessed 8 October 2004.

<sup>4</sup> George W. Bush, *The National Security Strategy of the United States of America* (Washington, D.C.: The White House, September 2002), 5

<sup>5</sup> Ibid., 9.

<sup>6</sup> Mark Burgess, "A Natural Fear Increased with Tales: America's Aversion to Nation Building and Peacekeeping," 8 March 2002; available from <<http://www.cdi.org/terrorism/nation-building-pr.cfm>>; Internet; accessed 28 September 2004.

<sup>7</sup> Department of the Army, *Stability Operations and Support Operations*, Field Manual 3-07 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of the Army, February 2003), ii.

<sup>8</sup> Ibid.

<sup>9</sup> In both France and Italy the poverty of the post-war era had provided fuel for the communist parties who had seen significant electoral success. Wikipedia, "Marshall Plan," 26 November 2004; available from <[http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Marshall\\_Plan](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Marshall_Plan)>; Internet; accessed 26 November 2004.

<sup>10</sup> Department of State: International Information Programs, "The Marshall Plan (1947)," 30 June 1947; available from <<http://usinfo.state.gov/usa/infousa/facts/democrac/57.htm>>; Internet; accessed 8 October 2004.

<sup>11</sup> Institute for National Strategic Studies, *Somalia Operations: Lessons Learned*; available from <<http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/ndu/allardch1.html>>; Internet; accessed 15 November 2004.

<sup>12</sup> Robert B. Oakley, Michael J. Dziedzic, and Eliot M. Goldberg, *Policing the New World Disorder: Peace Operations and Public Security* (Washington, D.C.: National Defense University Press, May 1998), 176.

<sup>13</sup> Kenneth Allard, Institute for National Strategic Studies, *Somalia Operations: Lessons Learned*; available from <[http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/ndu/allard\\_somalia/allardch1.html](http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/ndu/allard_somalia/allardch1.html)>; Internet; accessed 15 November 2004.

<sup>14</sup> Ibid.

<sup>15</sup> "United Nations Protection Force," 30 November 1994; available from <[http://www.gmu.edu/departments/t-po/resource-bk/mission/unprofor\\_un.html](http://www.gmu.edu/departments/t-po/resource-bk/mission/unprofor_un.html)>; Internet; accessed 13 January 2005.

<sup>16</sup> "UNPROFOR," September 1996. available from <[http://www.un.org/Depts/DPKO/Missions/unprof\\_b.htm](http://www.un.org/Depts/DPKO/Missions/unprof_b.htm)>; Internet; accessed 13 January 2005.

<sup>17</sup> "United Nations Resolution 958," 19 November 1994; available from <<http://www.nato.int/for/un/u941119a.htm>>; Internet; accessed 13 January 2005.

<sup>18</sup> "United Nations Resolution 959," 19 November 1994; available from <<http://www.nato.int/for/un/u941119b.htm>>; Internet; accessed 13 January 2005.

<sup>19</sup> Karl von Wogau, "The Path to European Defence," December 2004, available from <<http://www.european-defence.co.uk/directory/althea.html>>; Internet; accessed 14 January 2005.

<sup>20</sup> The information in this sentence is taken from remarks made by a speaker participating in the Commandant's Lecture Series at the U.S. Army War College during academic year 2005.

<sup>21</sup> Andrew S. Natsios, "Commander's Guidance: A Challenge of Complex Humanitarian Emergencies," *Parameters* (Summer 1996): available from <<http://carlisle-www.army.mil/usawc/parameters/96summer/natsios.htm>>; Internet; accessed 27 November 2004.

<sup>22</sup> Max G. Manwaring, "Peace and Stability Lessons from Bosnia," *Parameters*, Winter 1998; available from <<http://carlisle-www.army.mil/usawc/parameters/98winter/manwari.htm>>; Internet; accessed 27 November 2004.

<sup>23</sup> Wesley Clark, *Waging Modern War: Bosnia, Kosovo, and the Future of Combat* (New York: Public Affairs Press, 2001), 458.

<sup>24</sup> von Wogau.

<sup>25</sup> CIA World Fact Book, "*Rwanda*," 2 November 2004; available from [www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/goes/rw.html](http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/goes/rw.html); Internet; accessed 27 November 2004.

<sup>26</sup> Bradley Graham, "Pentagon Officials Worry Aid Missions Will Sap Military Strength," *The Washington Post*, 29 July 1994, p. A29.

<sup>27</sup> European Command, *After Action Report, Operation Support Hope*, (Heidelberg, GER: U.S. European Command, 1995), 26.

<sup>28</sup> John E. Lange, "Civilian-Military Cooperation and Humanitarian Assistance: Lessons From Rwanda." 1998, available from <<http://www.ambarwanda.org.uk/news/Archive/jelange.htm>>; Internet; accessed 28 November 2004.

<sup>29</sup> Global Security.org. "Operation Uphold Democracy," 2 March 2004; available from <[http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/ops/uphold\\_democracy.htm](http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/ops/uphold_democracy.htm)>; Internet; accessed 27 November 2004.

<sup>30</sup> Ibid.

<sup>31</sup> Ibid.

<sup>32</sup> James F. Dobbins, "Haiti: A Case Study in Post-Cold War Peacekeeping," *ISD Report*, 1 October 1995; available from <<http://sfswww.georgetown.edu/sfs/programs/isd/files/haiti.htm>>; Internet; accessed 27 November 2004.

<sup>33</sup> Ibid.

<sup>34</sup> Ibid.

<sup>35</sup> Ibid.

<sup>36</sup> Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Joint Doctrine for Operations Other Than War*, Joint Pub 3-07 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, 16 June 1995), iv.

<sup>37</sup> William J. Clinton, *Presidential Decision Directive 56 on "Complex Contingency Operations"*, May 1997; available from <<http://clinton2.nara.gov/WH/EOP/NSC/html/documents/NSCdoc2.html>>; Internet; accessed 8 October 2004.

<sup>38</sup> Ibid.

<sup>39</sup> LTC Calvin Pilgrim, "Logisticians Execute Peace Operations," January 1996; available from <<http://www.almc.army.mil/alog/issues/Janfeb96/ms893.htm>>; Internet; accessed 8 October 2004.

<sup>40</sup> Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Peace Operations*, Joint Pub 3-07.3 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, 12 February 1999), xii.

<sup>41</sup> Donald Rumsfeld, "Beyond Nation-Building," *The Washington Post*, 25 September 2004, available from <<http://usinfo.state.gov/mena/Archive/2004/Jan/29-267854.html>>; Internet; accessed 5 October 2004.

<sup>42</sup> Department of State, available from <<http://contact-us.state.gov/>>; Internet; accessed 5 December 2004.

<sup>43</sup> George W. Bush, *The National Security Strategy of the United States of America* (Washington, D.C.: The White House, September 2002), 1

<sup>44</sup> John Pike, "Where are the Legions? [SPQR] Global Deployments of US Forces," 23 August 2004; available from <<http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/ops/global-deployments.htm>>; Internet; accessed 11 October 2004.

<sup>45</sup> United Nations, Homepage, available from <<http://www.un.org/english/>>; Internet; accessed 11 October 2004.

<sup>46</sup> United Nations Peacekeeping, available from <<http://www.un.org/peace/>>; Internet; accessed 11 October 2004.

<sup>47</sup> UN News Service, "New Head of UN Anti-Terrorism Office Outlines Comprehensive Battle Plan," available from <<http://www.un.org/apps/news/storyAr.asp?NewsID=12276&Cr=terror&Cr1=>>>; Internet, accessed 14 January 2005.

<sup>48</sup> The idea in this paragraph is taken from remarks made by a speaker at the U.S. Army War College during academic year 2005.

<sup>49</sup> Fox News Opinion Dynamics Poll, 11-12 January 2005; available from <<http://www.pollingreport.com/iraq.htm>>; Internet; accessed 14 January 2005.

<sup>50</sup> CBS News Poll, "War on Terrorism;" 6 September 2004; available from <<http://www.pollingreport.com/terror.htm>>; Internet; accessed 11 October 2004.

<sup>51</sup> CIA World Fact Book, "Rank Order GDP," 13 January 2005; available from <<http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/rankorder/2001rank.html>>; Internet; accessed 26 January 2005.

## BIBLIOGRAPHY

- Allard, Kenneth. *Somalia Operations: Lessons Learned* Washington, D.C.: National Defense University Press, 1995.
- Barton, Frederick, and Bathsheba Crocker, Project Directors. *Progress or Peril? Measuring Iraq's Reconstruction*, September 2004. Available from <[http://america.scientium.com/bush2004/documents/0409\\_progressperil.pdf](http://america.scientium.com/bush2004/documents/0409_progressperil.pdf)>. Internet. Accessed 27 September 2004.
- Burgess, Mark. "A Natural Fear Increased with Tales: America's Aversion to Nation Building And Peacekeeping." 8 March 2002. Available from <<http://www.cdi.org/terrorism/nation-building-pr.cfm>>. Internet. Accessed 28 September 2004.
- Bush, George W. *The National Security Strategy of the United States of America*. Washington, D.C.: The White House, September 2002.
- Clark, Wesley. *Waging Modern War: Bosnia, Kosovo, and the Future of Comba*. New York: Public Affairs Press, 2001.
- Clark, Wesley. Remarks made at the Brookings Institution. 8 June 2000. Available from <<http://www.officepristina.rpo.at/clark.htm>>. Internet. Accessed 27 November 2004.
- Clinton, William J. *Presidential Decision Directive 56 on "Complex Contingency Operations."* Washington, D.C.: The White House, May 1997.
- Cohen, William S. "Personal Accountability for Force Protection at Khobar Towers." 31 July 1997. Available from <<http://www.defenselink.mil/pubs/khobar/>>. Internet. Accessed October 2004.
- Congressional Budget Office. *Paying for Iraq's Reconstruction*. January 2004. Available from <<http://www.cbo.gov/showdoc.cfm?index=4983&sequence=2>>. Internet. Accessed 20 September 2004.
- Cordesman, Andrew H. *The "Post Conflict" Lessons of Iraq and Afghanistan*. Testimony to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, 19 May 2004.
- Council of Foreign Relations. "Terrorism: Q & A." May 2003. Available from <<http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/geos/af.html>>. Internet. Accessed 11 October 2004.
- Crane, Conrad C., and W. Andrew Terrill, *Reconstructing Iraq: Challenges and Missions for Military Forces in a Post-Conflict Scenario*. Carlisle Barracks: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, 29 January 2003.
- Dobbins, James F. "Haiti: A Case Study in Post-Cold War Peacekeeping." 1 October 1995. Available from <<http://sfswww.georgetown.edu/sfs/programs/isd/files/haiti.htm>>. Internet. Accessed 27 November 2004.
- \_\_\_\_\_. "Next Steps in Iraq and Beyond." Presented to the Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate, 23 September 2003.

- Dodge, Toby. *Inventing Iraq: The Failure of Nation Building and a History Denied*. New York: Colombia University Press, 2003.
- Field, Kimberly C. and Robert M. Perito. "Creating a Force for Peace Operations: Ensuring Stability with Justice." *Parameters* (Winter 2002-2003): 77-87.
- Flavin, William. "Planning for Conflict Termination and Post-Conflict Success." *Parameters* (Autumn 2003): 99-112.
- Frazier, Mitch. "Iraq Reconstruction Continues." 18 September 2004. Available from <<http://www.grd.usace.army.mil/new/releases/reconsep18.html>>. Internet. Accessed 28 September 2004.
- Frye, Alton, Project Director. *Humanitarian Intervention, Crafting a Workable Doctrine: Three Options Presented as Memoranda to the President*. Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 2000.
- Global Security.org. "Operation Uphold Democracy." 2 March 2004. Available from <[http://www.globalsecurity.org.military/ops/uphold\\_democracy.htm](http://www.globalsecurity.org.military/ops/uphold_democracy.htm)>. Internet. Accessed 27 November 2004.
- Graham, Bradley. "Pentagon Officials Worry Aid Missions Will Sap Military Strength." *The Washington Post*, 29 July 1994, p. A29.
- Hasskamp, Charles W. *Operations other than War: Who Says Warriors Don't Do Windows?* Maxwell Air Force Base: Air War College, March 1998.
- Institute for National Strategic Studies. *Somalia Operations: Lessons Learned* January 1995. Available from <<http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/ndu/allardch1.html>>. Internet. Accessed 15 November 2004.
- KFOR: Official web site of Kosovo Force. "KFOR Objectives/Mission." Available from <<http://www.nato.int/kfor/kfor/objectives.htm>>. Internet. Accessed 5 December 2004.
- Kozaryn, Linda D. "Balkans, Lessons Learned, Discussed at NATO Meetings." September 1999. Available from <[http://www.defenselink.mil/news/Sep1999/n09221999\\_9909221.html](http://www.defenselink.mil/news/Sep1999/n09221999_9909221.html)>. Internet. Accessed 15 November 2004.
- LaFranchi, Howard. "Round 2 for US Nation-Building in Hati." *The Christian Science Monitor* 2 March 2004, sec. 2, p.1.
- Lange, John E. "Civilian-Military Cooperation and Humanitarian Assistance: Lessons from Rwanda." *Parameters* (Summer 1998): 106-122.
- Manwaring, Max G. "Peace and Stability Lessons from Bosnia." *Parameters* (Winter 1998): 28-38.
- Myers, Richard B. *National Military Strategy of the United States of America*. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2004.

- National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States. *The 9/11 Commission Report*. 2004. Available from <[http://www.9-11commission.gov/report/911Report\\_Exec.htm](http://www.9-11commission.gov/report/911Report_Exec.htm)>. Internet. Accessed 8 October 2004.
- Natsios, Andrew S. "Commander's Guidance: A Challenge of Complex Humanitarian Emergencies." *Parameters* (Summer 1996): 50-66.
- NATO. "NATO's Role in Relation to the Conflict in KOSOVO." 15 July 1999. Available from <<http://www.nato.int/kosovo/history.htm>>. Internet. Accessed 15 November 2004.
- NATO On-line Library. "NATO's Role in Bosnia and Herzegovina." 8 May 2001. Available from <<http://www.nato.int/docu/facts/2000/role-bih.htm>>. Internet. Accessed 27 November 2004.
- Oakley, Robert B., Michael J. Dziedzic, and Eliot M. Goldberg. *Policing the New World Disorder: Peace Operations and Public Security*. Washington, D.C.: National Defense University Press, 1998.
- U.S. Assistant Secretary of Defense. "Joint Statement on the Kosovo After Action Review. 14 October 1999. Available from <<http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/kosovooa/jointstmt.htm>>. Internet. Accessed 27 November 2004.
- O'Hanlon, Michael E. *Expanding Military Capacity for Humanitarian Intervention*, Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 2003.
- Perito, Robert M. *Where is the Lone Ranger When We Need Him? America's Search for a Postconflict Stability Force*. Washington, D.C.: United States Institute of Peace Press, 2004.
- Pike, John. "Where Are the Legions? [SPQR] Global Deployments of US Forces." 23 August 2004. Available from <<http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/ops/global-deployments.htm>>. Internet. Accessed 11 October 2004.
- Pilgrim, Calvin. "Logisticians Execute Peace Operations." January 1996. Available from <<http://www.almc.army.mil/alog/issues/Janfeb96/ms893.htm>>. Internet. Accessed 8 October 2003.
- Rosenberg, Jerry M., *Nation-Building: A Middle East Recovery Program*. Lanham, Maryland: University Press of America, 2003.
- Rumsfeld, Donald. "Beyond 'Nation-Building'." *Washington Post*, 25 September 2003, p. A33.
- Snyder, R. "Operation Restore Hope/Battle of Mogadishu." August 2001. Available from <<http://novaonline.nvcc.edu/eli/evans/his135/Events/Somalia93/Somalia93.html>>. Internet. Accessed 8 October 2004.
- Stofft, William A., and Gary L. Guertner. "Ethnic Conflict: The Perils of Military Intervention." *Parameters* (Spring 1995): 30-42.
- United Nations. "Haiti – Background." Available from <[http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/dpko/co\\_mission/unmihbackgr1.html](http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/dpko/co_mission/unmihbackgr1.html)>. Internet. Accessed 28 November 2004.



- United Nations. Homepage. Available from <<http://www.un.org/english/>>. Internet. Accessed 11 October 2004.
- UN News Service. "New Head of UN Anti-Terrorism Office Outlines Comprehensive Battle Plan." Available from <<http://www.un.org/apps/news/storyAr.asp?NewsID=12276&Cr=terror&Cr1=>>>. Internet. Accessed 14 January 2005.
- United Nations. "Peacekeeping." Available from <<http://www.un.org/peace/>>. Internet. Accessed 11 October 2004.
- UNPROFOR. "United Nations Protection Force." Available from <[www.gmu.edu/departments/t-po/resource-bk/mission/unprofor\\_un.html](http://www.gmu.edu/departments/t-po/resource-bk/mission/unprofor_un.html)>. Internet. Accessed 27 November 2004.
- United Nations. "Report of the Policy Working Group on the United Nations and Terrorism." 2002. Available from <<http://www.un.org/terrorism/a57273.doc>>. Internet. Accessed 11 October 2004.
- United Nations. "United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo." Available from <<http://www.unmikonline.org/chrono.htm>>. Internet. Accessed 4 December 2004.
- U.S. Central Intelligence Agency. *The World Fact Book*. "Rank Order GDP," 13 January 2005. Available from <<http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/rankorder/2001rank.html>>. Internet. Accessed 26 January 2005.
- U.S. Central Intelligence Agency. *The World Fact Book*. "Rwanda." 16 December 2004. Available from <<http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/geos/rw.html>>. Internet. Accessed 17 January 2005.
- U.S. Central Intelligence Agency. *The World Fact Book*. "Serbia and Montenegro." 2 November 2004. Available from <<http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/geos/yi.html>>. Internet. Accessed November 2004.
- U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff. *Joint Doctrine for Military Operations Other Than War*. Joint Pub 3-07 Washington, D.C.: U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, 16 June 1995.
- U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff. *Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Peace Operations*. Joint Pub 3-07.3 Washington, D.C.: U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, 12 February 1999.
- U.S. Department of Defense. "USS Cole Commission Report." 9 January 2001. Available from <<http://www.defenselink.mil/pubs/cole20010109.html>>. Internet. Accessed 8 October 2004.
- U.S. Department of the Army. *Stability Operations and Support Operations*. Field Manual 3-07. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of the Army, February 2003.
- U.S. European Command. "After Action Report, Operation Support Hope." Heidelberg, GER: U.S. European Command, 1995.
- U.S. Department of State. Home Page. Available from <<http://contact-us.state.gov/>>. Internet. Accessed 5 December 2004.

U.S. Department of State. International Information Programs. "The Marshall Plan (1947)." 30 June 1947. Available from <<http://usinfo.state.gov/usa/infousa/facts/democrac/57.htm>>. Internet. Accessed 8 October 2004.

von Wogau, Karl. "The Path to European Defence." December 2004. Available from <<http://www.european-defence.co.uk/directory/althea.html>>. Internet. Accessed 14 January 2005.

Wikipedia Encyclopedia. "Marshall Plan." 26 November 2004. Available from <[http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Marshall\\_Plan](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Marshall_Plan)>. Internet. Accessed 26 November 2004.

\_\_\_\_\_. "World Trade Center Bombing." 3 October 2004. Available from <[http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/World\\_Trade\\_Center\\_bombing](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/World_Trade_Center_bombing)>. Internet. Accessed 8 October 2004.

